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Accidental Releases of Hazardous Materials
and Relevance to Terrorist Threats at
Industrial Facilities
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Abstract
Hazardous material releases, some with serious consequences, are a common occurrence in
the U.S. Of late, the hazards posed by releases caused by terrorist attacks or natural disasters have
been of particular concern. Although terrorism directed at hazardous material handling industries
within the U.S. has not yet resulted in a significant incident, there is much recent experience with
serious accidental releases resulting from natural disasters. Case studies are developed from a
number of recent natural disasters and severe weather events that resulted in large releases of
hazardous materials. These case studies are used to illustrate parallels between the risks posed by
hazardous material releases resulting from terrorism and natural disasters; examples include the
presence of a dominant mechanism for physical damage, difficult-to-control and unforeseen
scenarios of releases, limited specific regulation of the risks, and a complex and difficult response
environment. Hence, lessons learned from previous experience with releases during natural
disasters can be used to increase the resilience of industrial facilities and to improve the planning
for hazardous material response in the face of terror threats. Routes to improve hazardous material
industry preparedness for terror attack and natural disasters include physical hardening of facilities
and equipment, utilization of passive safety devices, greater consideration of facility layout and
siting, application of inherently safer design principles, and additional legislation at local, state or
federal levels.
KEYWORDS: natech, chemical facilites, terrorism, natural disaster, hazardous material
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Introduction: 
 
The terrorism threat to hazardous chemical (hazmat) handling industries within 
the US has not yet resulted in a significant attack on hazmat facilities (Kosal 
2007), and hence mitigation/response plans for such an event have not been tested 
in real-world situations. In this study, we address this lack of first-hand 
experience with terrorist-triggered chemical releases by analyzing the large 
amount of empirical data available from accidental releases of hazmats due to 
natural hazards. Given the similarity in the health risks posed by chemical 
releases due to terrorism and natural hazards, as well as the similarity of the 
challenges in response, releases caused by natural hazards can offer valuable 
lessons for risk management of terrorist-triggered releases. Accidental chemical 
releases triggered by natural hazards, sometimes referred to as natechs (Showalter 
and Myers 1994), are especially relevant to terrorism for a number of reasons:  
 
  Applicable regulatory requirements which serve to mitigate natech risk 
are largely through programs that apply generally to hazmat management, 
with little specific consideration of the role played by natural hazards as an 
initiating event1 (Cruz and Okada 2008).  As a result, although many 
vulnerable facilities plan for natural hazards in general (e.g. a hurricane 
plan), fewer facilities perform detailed analysis of natech risk (e.g. inclusion 
in a Process Safety Management Hazard Assessment). Hence, natech 
failures can often occur in unforeseen ways. Likewise, terrorism-caused 
failures are not considered in typical process safety analyses, and process 
design does not typically include anti-terrorism provisions (Whiteley and 
Wagner 2004). Thus, like natechs, terrorist-triggered releases can more 
easily result in releases that have not been planned or prepared for. 
 By definition, natechs are associated with a coincident natural hazard 
event, so resources must be shared between responses for both events. 
Hazmat response is also compromised because site access and supportive 
infrastructure are limited by the effects of a large natural disaster (see 
Lindell and Perry 1996, Steinberg and Cruz 2004 for discussion of effects of 
earthquakes, and Cruz et al. 2001, Santella et al. 2010 for effects from 
hurricanes). Response may also be complicated by uncertainty as to whether 
new releases or physical hazards are imminent, e.g., from earthquake 
aftershocks. Likewise, a well-coordinated terrorist attack may seek to 
destroy or inhibit response mechanisms, mechanical or human, so that the 
                                                 
1 In the US, a prominent exception is the hazmat risk posed by earthquakes in California. For 
example, the California Accidental Release Prevention (CalARP) program requires industrial 
plants that handle highly hazardous materials to perform a detailed seismic risk assessment. 
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effects of the attack are maximized.2 This may take the form of multiple 
simultaneous attacks or secondary attacks targeting first responders, and 
such an act, or its threat, may significantly hinder emergency response.  The 
possibility also exists that terrorists may launch an attack on the heels of a 
pre-existing catastrophe, like a land-falling hurricane, in order to maximize 
impact. 
 Because natechs take place in the midst of a natural disaster, the 
community’s level of concern regarding the chemical release is compounded 
by the stresses resulting from the natural disaster. This may lead to an 
increased level of social disruption and mental health issues than might 
occur under either set of circumstances individually. Similarly, the impact on 
the community of a terrorist-caused chemical release would likely be 
exacerbated by the knowledge of its source. This combination might 
increase the psychological burden on the threatened population and 
contribute to counterproductive behavior, such as attempting evacuation 
against official instructions (e.g., Boscarino et al. 2003) or seeking unneeded 
medical treatment (e.g., Stone 2007).  
 
 This work uses a variety of data sources to develop case studies of recent 
natural disasters and severe weather that resulted in large releases of hazmats. The 
goal is to highlight the challenges presented by these events and demonstrate their 
salience to the work of emergency managers and homeland security practitioners. 
Case studies illustrate the factors leading to serious natech events and their 
impacts on industrial facilities and nearby communities. The case studies also 
illustrate steps that can be taken by industry as well as local and state emergency 
managers to reduce the risks posed by both natechs and terrorist attacks on 
industrial facilities through changes in procedures and equipment investment.  
 
Methodology 
 
Case studies were developed for a selection of serious natechs. To sample a broad 
range of events, releases were identified from reports to the U.S. Coast Guard’s 
National Response Center (NRC). The NRC is the national point of contact for 
reporting discharges into the environment and over 25,000 releases are reported 
annually.  Although some radiological releases are reported through the NRC this 
work focuses on chemical hazmat releases. The record of hazmat releases 
provided by the NRC is the most extensive in the US. However a number of 
limitations exist in the quality of this data. These include inconsistencies with 
                                                 
2 For example, both the timing and location of the 9/11 attacks in NYC served to destroy and 
disrupt response capabilities 
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records present in other state or federal hazmat release databases, lack of 
identification of the root cause of events, incomplete reports, inclusion of many 
records where casualties were not related to hazmat, duplicate reports, and the 
inclusion of many low severity releases. Some of these limitations, were 
addressed by the analyisis methods described below, but it must be rememberd 
that reports represent the state of knowledge soon after the release, for example 
approximately one third of reports do not record the quantity of material involved.  
NRC  data for 1990 through 2008 was first downloaded  and records were 
filtered to remove events not involving a release, planned continuous releases, 
and reports describing drills. Events caused by natural hazards were then 
identified both by selection of events where the event cause was coded as “natural 
phenomena” and a series of keyword searches of written descriptions of the 
events for phrases indicative of various natural hazards. Over 16,000 releases 
caused by natural hazards were identified, many of them minor. Although this 
selection is sizeable, and should record most of the more serious events, this 
represents only a subset of the total number of natchs occurring in the US.  
 This pool of potential events for case studies was distilled based on 
several fields in the NRC database indicative of event severity including  the 
quantity and type of material released, consequences such as contamination of 
water bodies, and level of media interest. The several hundred releases identified 
through these criteria were researched further, and a single natural hazard event, 
sometimes involving numerous releases, was selected to represent earthquakes, 
lightning, rainstorms, tornadoes, floods, and hurricanes. Selection of the case 
study for each hazard was based on both the event's inherent interest and how 
well the releases would represent the larger body of similar events in the IRIS 
record. However, events were selected by a partially subjective process and are 
not intended as a representative sample of serious natechs.  
 To provide more detailed information for each event than available from 
the preliminary reports to the NRC media reports available through the Lexis-
Nexis Academic Database, government reports, and company press releases were 
used. In some cases this was supplemented with information gathered from phone 
interviews with federal, state, and local agencies. This analysis focuses only on 
events in the US, thereby excluding many more catastrophic examples in other 
countries. However, these events have many common factors with international 
events with serious consequences, such as 1994 flooding in Durunqa, Egypt 
(Smith 2001), the 1999 Izmit earthquake in Turkey (Steinberg and Cruz 2004) and 
most recently the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in Japan which resulted in 
a number of serious chemical as well as radiological releases. 
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Results  
 
Earthquake, Nisqually Valley WA, February 28, 2001 
 
The 6.8 magnitude earthquake that occurred near Olympia WA in 2001 is the 
most recent major earthquake to impact a large US metropolitan area. Although 
there was significant damage, with initial estimates by FEMA of $2 billion, 
ground motion was weak compared to the earthquake’s magnitude due to the 
depth of the earthquake (McDonough 2002). Despite the relatively weak ground 
motion, the earthquake caused a number of hazmat releases. One release, a leak 
and subsequent explosion of a natural gas line, resulted in a fire at Cedar Creek 
Correctional Center and injured two workers (WDGER 2008). Numerous other 
natural gas leaks as well as several hazmat releases including asbestos, metal 
plating solution, and petroleum were also reported, but with no injuries 
(McDonough 2002). One of the gas leaks resulted in the evacuation 50 nearby 
mobile homes (WDGER 2008). An ammonia release required evacuation of 
eighteen employees when refrigerant pipes at Rainier Cold storage in Seattle 
ruptured (IRIS). It is suspected that liquefaction of the fill material underlying the 
storage facility contributed to the release. The affected building and several others 
nearby were severely damaged and subsequently abandoned (Port of Seattle 
2004).  
 Although both the number and the size of releases from the Nisqually 
earthquake were relatively small, they were similar in mechanism to the 
numerous releases observed during the more destructive 6.9 magnitude Loma 
Prieta and 6.7 magnitude Northridge earthquakes in California. In all three cases, 
failure of pipelines, damage to asbestos-containing insulation, and releases from 
sloshing of open vessels occurred. Similar releases are also occasionally reported 
to IRIS during smaller US earthquakes, but generally with only one or two 
incidents resulting from each quake. Hazmat releases during earthquakes in the 
US have generally not had severe consequences, probably in part because of 
adherence to seismic building codes, particularly for large storage tanks. 
However, the number and circumstances of releases, as revealed in empirical data 
collected from large US earthquakes, indicate that the next high magnitude 
earthquake may result in many releases, some potentially dangerous, for which 
industry and emergency responders are likely to be unprepared. 
  
Lightning, Sonoma TX, November 2000 
 
A lighting strike on November 5, 2000 resulted in escalation of a small fire into a 
serious release through a set of cascading events. Two drums of flammable 
material at a Multi-Chem warehouse and storage area were ignited by lightning. 
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Despite efforts of local fire fighters, flaming liquid from the drums spread and 
ignited a wooden utility pole, which subsequently fell, rupturing the natural gas 
pipeline supplying the site. The natural gas was ignited by electrical arcing from 
the downed lines and resulted in a fire that destroyed the warehouse and ignited 
most of the product stored on site and a fire engine. Approximately 200 nearby 
residents were evacuated from within a 0.5 mile radius (IRIS), and two residents 
were treated for smoke inhalation. All residents except those within a two block 
radius of the site were permitted to return home when the fire was extinguished 
three hours later (AP 2000). Two days later, 15 nearby residents had still not 
returned to their homes (EPA 2000). Cleanup after the fire was overseen by the 
Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission (TNRCC), assisted by EPA. 
Nearby waterways were temporarily dammed to contain contaminated rain and 
fire fighting water, and 63,000 gallons were collected for testing and disposal 
(IRIS).  
 Lightning is a common natural phenomenon that results in a substantial 
number of deaths and injuries as well as property damage in the US (e.g., Curran 
et al. 2000). Lightening also results in hazmat releases relatively frequently with 
over 1,200 releases related to lightning strikes recorded in IRIS, approximately 
3% of which resulted in releases greater than 10,000 gallons or pounds. Lightning 
strikes on petroleum storage tanks, which totaled 143 in IRIS, can be particularly 
dangerous. Emphasizing the threat posed by lighting induced releases, Persson 
and Lönnermark (2004) reviewed 480 large fuel tank fires worldwide and found 
that 150 (31%) resulted from lightning strikes. 
 
Rain, Lake Charles LA, June 19- 21 2006 
 
Although rain, apart from flooding, is not generally considered a serious natural 
hazard, serious hazmat releases can occur due to heavy rains.  This was the case 
during heavy rains over several days in Lake Charles, LA when as much as 12” of 
rain fell in a 24 hour period (NWS 2006). The volume of runoff resulted in the 
overflow of two large holding tanks containing rainwater and waste oil from the 
CITGO refineries drain system. Approximately 100,000 barrels of petroleum 
were released from the tanks. Secondary containment berms around the tanks 
subsequently leaked through a drainage pipe, releasing the oil to a lagoon. 
Approximately 25,000 barrels reached the Calcasieu River (AP 2006a). Initial 
attempts to contain the spill with booms failed, resulting in contamination of 
miles of river. The same facility also reported two other less serious releases due 
to the same rain event: unburned hydrocarbons to a flare and 100 lb of sulfur 
dioxide from a sulfur recovery unit (IRIS). Four nearby facilities also reported 
releases to the river as a result of overflow of storm water collection systems or 
secondary containment. Materials released included crude oil, coke fines, and 
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hexachlorobutadien (IRIS). As a result of the CITGO release, the Calcasieu river 
ship channel was closed for more than a week, reducing production at a number 
of refineries. Cleanup required more than 1,000 personnel with costs exceeding 
$10 million (AP 2006b). Because CITGO had been aware that the storm water 
retention system was under-capacity and an excessive quantity of petroleum was 
present in the tanks at the time of the release, the company was fined $13 million 
dollars (AP 2008).  The spill also resulted in the filing of over 200 lawsuits.  
 The CITGO release was unusual in its size and consequences, however 
heavy rains are the cause of many hazmat releases with over 4,200 recorded in 
IRIS. Although the majority of these releases are small, sometimes as little as a 
few drops of oil resulting in a sheen on a water body, a number were substantial.  
Seven releases of more than 10,000 gallons of petroleum and eight releases of 
more than 10,000 lb of hazardous chemicals have been reported.  
 
Tornado, Greensburg KS, May 4, 2007  
  
Hazmat releases can add to the inherent physical hazard associated with tornadoes 
as occurred during the catastrophic Greensburg, KS tornado. Ten people were 
killed and a warning 20 minutes before the tornado struck is credited with 
preventing greater fatalities (FEMA 2007). A national disaster was declared on 
May 6 and estimates of insured losses were over $153 million (KID 2007). 
Natural gas was released from damaged homes, necessitating a shutdown of gas 
supply to the town by Kansas Gas Service and several rail cars of petroleum 
condensate were overturned (IRIS). On May 7, during cleanup, a valve failed on a 
30,000 gallon anhydrous ammonia rail car tank damaged by the tornado. A 6 
block radius was evacuated around the leaking tank (EPA 2007) while a 
replacement valve for the rail car was located and installed (Wichita Eagle 2007).  
 Cleanup of hazmats in Greensburg was an extended process with input 
from a number of responding agencies. EPA Region 7 personnel with a mobile 
command post arrived the day after the tornado. EPA Superfund Technical 
Assistance Response Team (START) contractors were also brought in to assess 
damaged electrical transformers for potential PCB contamination, and 106 
transformers were collected for disposal (EPA 2007). EPA was given 
responsibility by FEMA for initial separation and collection of household 
hazardous waste (HHW) and white goods from other debris. By the end of EPA 
involvement, 36,728 pieces of HHW and white goods had been collected 
including various chemicals, paint, propane, and compressed gases. A state 
hazmat response team also was called into operation during the recovery. The 
team demobilized on May 21, transferring responsibility to EPA personnel who 
turned responsibility over to the Kansas Department of Health & Environment on 
June 9. 
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 Tornadoes which hit populated d areas have serious consequences in terms 
of both fatalities and property damage (Brooks and Doswell 2001). Hazmat 
releases caused by tornadoes are, however, relatively infrequent, with just under 
300 recorded in the IRIS record. The infrequent nature of releases, despite the 
high frequency of tornadoes, is in large part due to the small footprint of 
individual tornadoes which may not overlap with locations of industrial facilities. 
However, given the powerful winds generated by tornados and the reluctance of 
owners to build to withstand such extreme events, the possibility exists for 
catastrophic release upon the intersection of a major tornado and a hazmat 
handling facility.  
 
Flood, Coffeyville KS, July 1 2007 
 
Heavy rains over several days led to flooding on the Verdigris River and the 
evacuation of over 2,500 residents from Coffeyville KS (Reuters 2007) with a 
national disaster declared July 2. The Coffeyville Resources Refinery performed a 
rushed emergency shut down due to flooding and several hours later an oil spill 
was discovered at the site (NewsInferno 2007).  The refinery was flooded by up 
to 6 feet of water, shifting storage tanks (EPA 2007a) but the Kansas Department 
of Health and Environment attributed the release of over 71,000 gallons of crude 
oil to a valve left open (Wichita Eagle 7, 29, 07). Additionally 4,200 gallons of 
petroleum was released due to flooding of the refinery’s sewer system (IRIS). 
Spread by the flood waters, oil contaminated over 300 homes and businesses and 
traveled down the Verdigris River. Overflights observed sheen 10 miles 
downstream causing fear that Oologah Lake and water supply intakes might 
become contaminated. Later in July, benzene and hydrogen sulfide emissions 
were reported from flare stacks at the refinery during the recovery process (IRIS). 
The Coffeyville Resources Nitrogen plant adjacent to the refinery, but at a higher 
elevation, also shut down, releasing 100 lb of anhydrous ammonia and an 
unknown amount of ammonia due to loss of power (IRIS). 
 Cleanup after the flood involved federal and state responders as well as 
private contractors. EPA on-scene coordinators inspected the refinery site the day 
the release was discovered. Personnel from EPA Regions 6 and 7 as well as 
START contractors conducted tests in Coffeyville, along the Verdigris River and 
in Lake Oologah near drinking water intakes. None of the tests indicated health 
risks (EPA 2007b). EPA also assisted state authorities with collection and disposal 
of household hazardous waste and orphaned containers of hazmats dispersed by 
the flooding. Several private remediation companies were hired by the refinery to 
respond to the release including O’Brien’s Group who were involved in the 
response to the Murphy Oil spill resulting from Hurricane Katrina (Coffeyville 
Resources Jul 7 2007). Coffeyville Resources conducted a buyout of affected 
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residences and 313 homes were purchased and demolished. In 2008, a $4.39 
million lawsuit was filed against the company by those affected by spill (Wichita 
Eagle 8, 21 08).  
 Flooding is a common and costly natural hazard. Releases of hazmat 
caused by floods are also relatively common with over 1,100 identified in the 
IRIS record. Releases from small orphaned containers, which are rarely reported 
to IRIS, are likely to be much more frequent. There were 350 reports in which 
flooding resulted in releases of chemical or petroleum products from storage 
tanks. In approximately 30 of these cases, releases are known to be over 1,000 
gallons, with many additional reports in which the size of the release was not 
reported. 
 
Hurricane Ike, September 13, 2008 
 
Hurricane Ike made landfall in Galveston, TX September 13 as a large Category 2 
hurricane. Federal emergencies were declared in Florida on Sept 7, Texas on Sept 
10, and Louisiana on Sept 11 prior to landfall in order to authorize mobilization of 
federal emergency response resources. In the days prior to landfall, many 
chemical and petroleum facilities began shutdown procedures, sometimes 
resulting in releases to flare systems, and put hurricane ride-out crews in place. 
Due to flooding and high winds, a federal disaster was declared for parts of Texas, 
Louisiana, Alabama Arkansas, Ohio and Kentucky. The effects of Hurricane Ike 
resulted in a large number of hazmat releases with over 3,000 reported to state 
and federal agencies according to news reports (Associated Press 2008) and 
almost 500 reports to the NRC. The largest release, approximately 900,000 
gallons of distillates, occurred at a Magellan Midstream Partners terminal in 
Galena Park, Texas just outside of Houston on the shipping channel. This release 
required the booming off of parts of the facility and shipping channel and 
ultimately. Most of the material from this release was recovered (IRIS).  
 Another large spill occurred on Goat Island, Texas where storm surge 
flooded the St. Mary Land and Exploration Co. plant, damaging secondary 
containment dikes, valves, and piping attached to eight storage tanks holding 
crude oil and produced water (IRIS). Approximately 266,000 gallons of oil were 
spilled, almost all of which was dispersed by the hurricane.  Due to conditions 
after Ike, company responders took 24 hours to arrive by boat (Associated Press 
2008). The third largest release was in Texas City, Texas where a NuStar Energy 
terminal sustained approximately $18 million in damage (NuStar 2008) and 
reported a release of 33,474 gallons of a 30% sodium methylate and 70% 
methanol mixture (IRIS). In addition to larger releases, over 76,000 orphaned 
containers varying from small containers to larger storage tanks were collected, 
sorted and disposed of (EPA 2009 a,b). The scale of the releases required EPA, 
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Coast Guard, and a variety of state agency and private contractors to participate in 
the cleanup under a unified command structure with cleanup continuing for over 3 
months. In one incident early in the response, six coast guard personnel were 
hospitalized after coming into contact with displaced chemical tanks in the 
Houston shipping channel (Dean 2008).  
 Hurricanes account for the most costly natural disasters in the US because 
of the very large areas they impact with strong winds, storm surge and flooding. 
For the same reason, they are also the natural disaster most often associated with 
releases of hazmat in the IRIS record with over 3,300 releases recorded. At least 
53 releases were petroleum releases greater than 10,000 gallons and 36 were 
hazmat releases over 10,000 lb.  Many of these releases occurred as a result of 
recent hurricanes including Katrina and Rita in 2005 and Ike and Gustav in 2008 
but other large hurricanes such as Floyd in 1999, Isabelle in 2003 and Ivan in 
2004 also resulted in over 70 reported onshore releases each. Releases are 
reported to IRIS during almost all hurricanes which make landfall in the US. 
 
Discussion 
 
Natech releases in the US sometimes have serious consequences, although they 
have so far resulted in very few fatalities and limited injuries. Consequences 
observed in this study include direct injuries, threatened contamination of 
drinking water supplies, shutdown of transportation routes, and significant 
expenses from response, compensation and fines. These case studies confirm that 
natural hazards that cause destructive natechs tend to be: sudden in onset, severe, 
geographically diffuse, and disruptive of resources normally available for the 
operation of safety devices and support of emergency response (e.g., power, 
water, communication). 
Many of the attributes of natural hazards that lead to serious natech 
incidents also characterize typical scenarios of terrorist attacks against industries 
using and storing hazmats. Commonalities provide insight into mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery activities relevant to both threats. In the 
following discussion, these similarities are used as the basis for applying the 
sizable and expanding body of experience with natechs to the threat posed by 
terrorism to the chemical industry.  
One common characteristic of natural hazards and terrorist attacks is the 
predominance of a single major mechanism of direct damage. Damage to 
equipment, particularly tanks, valves, and piping, accounts for most large releases 
during natechs. Similarly, previous experience with terrorism suggests that direct 
attack with explosives on a plant’s physical facilities is the most likely threat to 
hazmat handling industries (Kosal 2007). These observations suggest that 
hardening of vulnerable plant elements may be an appropriate response to 
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mitigate both threats. Examples of this include installation of stabilizing tie 
downs and heightening of fluid detention facilities around storage tanks; 
construction of barriers to protect valves and piping from flood, air-born debris 
from explosions or storms, and deliberate vehicular impacts; and flexible joints 
and bracing for pipes that serve to limit seismic or indirect blast damage.  
In addition, the external nature of both terror and natural hazard threats as 
well as their sometimes sudden and unexpected onset, may make resulting 
releases harder to control than typical accidents. As a result, an even greater focus 
on mitigation measures such as facility location, layout, and process design can be 
helpful in addressing both threats (Whiteley and Wagner 2004, Moore and 
Kellogg 2006). Some have even argued that the threats posed to the public and 
the chemical industry by terrorism and natural disasters require a fundamental 
rethinking of US hazmat risk management policy, with a greater emphasis on 
inherently safer technologies (e.g., Malloy 2008). In the context of terrorism 
threats, it has been suggested that the Department of Homeland Security should 
support research and development to foster inherently safer chemical processes 
(NRC 2006). Indeed, adoption of safer alternative processes with the potential to 
deter terrorist use of hazmats has already been documented in some industries 
(Orum 2006). 
Technological controls, intended to mitigate release severity, are also 
applicable to both types of threats. Safeguards requiring human intervention may 
not be reliable during either a natural disaster or a terrorist attack, as operator 
action may not be possible for a variety of reasons, including site evacuation or 
unsafe conditions. For example, standard industry practice includes the 
confinement of hurricane ride-out crews during periods of high winds. Similarly, 
Whiteley and Wagner (2004) observe that procedural safeguards requiring 
specific actions by personnel cannot be relied upon in the case of terror attacks. 
Hence, passive or automated safety devices, such as flow restrictors, automated 
cutoffs, heat-actuated foam systems and automated scrubbers, may be more 
successful at limiting the severity of a release should damage to systems occur 
during a natural disaster or deliberate attack.  
Inadequate preparedness efforts can also contribute to the consequences of 
both types of threats. For instance, negligent practices by industry, including 
improper maintenance of pipes and tanks and poor operational practices, 
significantly contribute to the severity of natech events. Similarly, inadequate site 
security increases terrorism risk. Attention to basic procedures, such as routine 
inspection, maintenance, and site security, is critical for managing both types of 
threats. Given limited resources, appropriate plans for risk-based operation, 
maintenance, and security can reduce the potential for negligence to contribute to 
the likelihood or severity of a release.  
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Moreover, similarities between response and recovery from natechs and 
from terrorist attacks on hazmat handling industries can provide guidance on 
appropriate actions for impact reduction. Industries in areas vulnerable to natural 
disasters must plan to respond to releases and undertake recovery under severe 
conditions where much of the infrastructure of the surrounding area is unavailable 
and site access is limited (e.g., Moor and Kellogg 2007). The scale of damage and 
disruption from a terrorist attack on an industrial facility is unlikely to match that 
of a hurricane. However, terrorist acts may be planned to maximize disruption 
and public fear, for example by shutting down critical energy or transportation 
infrastructure. In such a case, response may be hindered by limited availability of 
transportation, resources, or lifelines as was the case after 9/11 (EPA 2002). In 
addition, first responders’ site access may be limited due to security concerns. 
Under such conditions, on-site response capabilities and plans for coordination of 
off-site response are likely to be overwhelmed. It is clear that preplanning for a 
complex large-scale response, considering in particular limited availability of 
resources such as backup water, power, and communication, is critical for both 
kinds of threats.  
Responding effectively to the environmental contamination resulting from 
either natechs or terrorist attack on industry is also a challenge. Because of the 
large area potentially affected by natural hazards, environmental remediation 
efforts for natech releases can be geographically widespread, long term, and 
complex. Examples of this can be seen in the extensive efforts after floods and 
hurricanes, often extending for months, to clean up petroleum spills on 
waterways, locate and recover orphan containers, and remediate contaminated 
soil. Such cleanup efforts often involve multiple jurisdictions; numerous federal, 
state and local responding agencies; private contractors; and stakeholders 
including private citizens, regulators, and affected companies (e.g., Santella et al. 
2010).  Responses to terrorist attacks are likely to be just as difficult and complex. 
Indeed, responses of unprecedented complexity by multiple agencies and with 
many stakeholders were typical of the remediation efforts at the World Trade 
Center and anthrax contaminated sites in 2001 (EPA 2002, GAO 2003). 
Furthermore, the risks posed by natech or terrorist threats, as well as 
available measures to identify and counter vulnerabilities, may or may not have 
been given sufficient consideration by facilities. Some companies in the chemical 
and petroleum industries have been proactive in addressing natural hazard risks, 
particularly after the experiences of Hurricane Katrina. Likewise, many hazmat 
handling industries have taken voluntary measures to reduce vulnerability to 
terrorist attack, and high risk facilities must comply with federal Chemical 
Facilities Anti-Terrorism Standards. On the other hand, it has been shown that 
company size is a determinant of the level of disaster preparedness efforts 
generally (e.g., Dahlhamer and D'Souza 1997, Webb et al. 2000) and for the 
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implementation of natech mitigation measures specifically (Cruz and Steinberg 
2005). Hence, smaller companies with fewer resources and limited experience 
with the complexities of natural hazards and terrorism may be less likely or able 
to fully evaluate the potential risk posed to their operations and to the public. 
Similarly, the benefits of changes to infrastructure, equipment, or operating 
procedures intended to limit the damage and reduce the risk of releases may be 
less apparent to smaller companies.  
Where an internal motivation for risk mitigation does not exist within 
industry, regulatory input in the form of federal, state, or local laws can serve to 
encourage effective planning, mitigation, and operation by industry. For example, 
on a local level, flood-vulnerable jurisdictions might incorporate into their land 
development regulations the National Fire Protection (NFP) standard 30 4.3.2.6 
for storage tanks in flood zones. Nationally, legislation encouraging the adoption 
of inherently safer technologies has been proposed, for example the Chemical 
Facility Anti-Terrorism Act of 2009 (H.R. 2868), and such measures continue to 
be debated. Legislative efforts can never eliminate terrorism risk to industry. 
Nevertheless, if precautionary steps are widely implemented, they may 
significantly reduce the risk of releases with catastrophic consequences. Likewise, 
while minor natechs are likely to continue on a regular basis, the risk of events 
with significant human health or environmental impacts can also be reduced. 
 
Conclusion 
 
These case studies suggest that the threat of natechs may require further 
consideration by industry, public emergency managers, and regulators in regions 
where industry is subject to severe natural hazards. Likewise, a terrorist attack on 
hazmat handling industries has the potential for serious public health risks that are 
not comprehensively addressed by mitigation efforts or response planning. 
Existing building codes, response capabilities, and regulations may be sufficient 
to protect the public from undue risk in the case of hazmat releases caused by 
minor natural hazards although such releases may still be costly. On the other 
hand, major natural disasters, such as earthquakes, hurricanes and large floods, or 
terrorism are likely to result in potentially dangerous releases which may 
overextend local, state, and even federal resources, delaying remediation and 
leading to greater risk to human health and the environment.  
 Parallels between natech and terrorist threats to hazmat handling industries 
include prominence of an external mechanism causing physical damage; difficult-
to-control and unforeseen scenarios of facility damage and releases; limited 
specific regulation of the risks; and a complex and difficult response environment.  
Hence, lessons learned from previous experience with natechs can be used to both 
reduce the vulnerability of industrial facilities to terrorist-triggered releases and to 
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improve hazmat response under the extreme and complex conditions which 
characterize terrorist attacks. Examples of methods to improve industry 
preparedness for terror attacks on hazmat handling facilities include physical 
hardening of facilities and equipment, use of passive safety devices, greater 
consideration of facility layout and siting, and wider application of inherently 
safer design principles.  In the case of both threats, additional legislation at local, 
state, or federal levels may be necessary to promote these types of risk reduction 
measures. 
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